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                 This paper focuses on the recent work of Slavoj Žižek and his extensive critique of 
post-structuralism and deconstruction from a Lacanian perspective. In this context, 
it examines Žižek’s provocative approach to questions of social reality, ideology 
and nationalism, and explores the potential of such an approach for an analysis of 
crucial themes in British political culture. In addition, the paper investigates the 
nature of the encounter between psychoanalysis and deconstruction - and 
especially where explicit referral is made to the terrain of politics - with a view to 
breaking the apparent deadlock that has emerged. Through the development of a 
post-marxist critique, it is argued that an alternative perspective can be formulated 
which combines the insights of both psychoanalysis and deconstruction and, at the 
same time, is able to transcend the limitations of each.                       
 
 
 In recent years the Lacanian school of thought has produced a number of 
highly original and provocative works which have drawn on psychoanalysis in order 
to shed light on a number of  issues which are of central concern to contemporary 
social and political theory. From questions of ideology and nationalism to the idea of 
reality itself these works have convincingly identified the paradoxical forces of ‘the 
Real’ which cannot be fully represented but which inexhaustibly drive the processes 
of representation as such. 
 In contrast to many perspectives that tend to identify Lacan as yet another 
acolyte of ‘post-modern’ theory, writers like Žižek and Copjec are concerned to 
emphasise a fundamental distinction between Lacan and the more ‘conventional’ 
positions of post-structuralism and deconstructive theory. In very broad terms, if post-
modern theory tends to stress de-centredness, the plural and the contextual, 
psychoanalytic theory is far more concerned with the ‘universal’ and ‘transcendental’ 
dimensions which underlie, and are constant in, all realities. In opposition to the 
historicism of thinkers like Foucault, for example, Copjec affirms that there are basic 
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and persistent forces of desire which can be identified within a general Lacanian, and 
anti-historicist, ‘order of the real’ (1994). However, this does not amount to a return to 
some new form of objectivism. On the contrary, according to these writers, 
psychoanalytic theory is even more radical in its critique of objectivism and takes the 
whole debate a stage further. 
 Beyond the familiar anti-essentialist claims of post-modern thought, for 
example, plurality is rather conceived as radical plurality insofar as it can be referred 
to an ultimate lack. Thus, for Žižek, plurality is a ‘multitude of responses to the same 
impossible-real kernel’ (1989: 4). Paradoxically, contingency is an essential condition 
in which the possible grows out of a transcendental impossibility. It is because the 
symbolic, or discursive, order can never fully master its object that we have an 
essential plurality written into the structure of reality itself. 
 Similarly, the subject is not simply a ‘decentred self’ or historical identity. It is 
not the classical subject of Foucault that aspires to an aesthetic and particularistic form 
of self-invention and self-mastery against universalist orthodoxy. For Lacan the 
situation is far more critical. Far from containing any positivity or consistency of its 
own the subject persists as a fundamental lack or void which can never be fully 
mastered in any Foucauldian sense. And here a crucial Lacanian distinction is made 
between subject and subjectivation (identification with subject-positions).1 While 
subjectivation depends upon its articulation within a signifying structure, the subject 
persists as an ultimate lack within that structure; a lack which can never be fully 
signified and which means that an unrepresentable condition of trauma lodges at the 
heart of every identity (the eternal ‘who am I?’).  
        In contrast to Althusser, then, the subject is precisely that which cannot be 
interpellated; or, as Žižek puts it, the subject ‘is the name of the void which cannot be 
filled out with subjectivation’ (1990, p.254). Indeed the subject may be regarded as 
the unbearable cipher of being which all forms of interpellation and identification 
attempt to prevent from  ‘emerging’ in all its effects of lack and dislocation. 
Identification, therefore, is ultimately a ‘delusional’ matter of concealing the fact that 
we live under the sign of erasure (which is why the Lacanian mark for the subject is 
$), and of eluding the encounter with our own immanent negation. It is in this respect 
that Žižek writes ‘the stake of the entire process of subjectivation, of assuming 
different subject-positions, is ultimately to enable us to avoid this traumatic 
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experience (of self negation and blockage)’ (1990, p.253). Thus new forms of 
subjectivity are always possible, not because of any post-modern playfulness or 
existential theatricality, but because of the universal and primal impossibility of 
interpellating the subject.2 
 Thus, according to Žižek, the mistake of post-structuralism is to focus too 
heavily on the contingent constructions of meaning  in a significatory network and to 
overlook the underlying and universal persistence of the Real - the unrepresentable 
and the impossible - which cannot be given any meaning within such a network. In 
particular, post-structuralism overlooks the transcendental forces of trauma and 
enjoyment which drive the symbolic  but which can never be fully captured by it. 
There is therefore no simple playfulness or irony in the significatory process. Rather 
we are doomed to be permanent raiders of the lost signifiers - to attempt to suture 
what is ultimately unsuturable - and thereby complete the circuit of enjoyment and 
bring an end to the quest of representation. And in this sense we might say that what 
the Lacanian perspective identifies is an ultimate ‘psychosis’ at work - which is 
constitutive of existence - in which the various constructions of reality will always be 
a signifier short of a full representation. 
 Focusing on the work of Žižek, this paper examines the consequences of the 
Lacanian approach for a new understanding of ideology and reality. It then moves to a 
consideration of the ‘theft of enjoyment’ thesis in the analysis of nationalism and to 
explore the insights here in relation to Britain. Finally the paper will present certain 
criticisms with a view to supplementing the Lacan-Žižekian perspective. Two main 
points are made. First that Žižek tends to draw too strong a distinction between his 
perspective and that of Derridean deconstruction and thereby does not allow for a 
more positive interplay and cross-fertilisation. The second, and more important, point 
is that when Žižek refers to the terrain of the political there appears to be a tendency 
towards an ‘excess’ of (Hegelian-dialectical) theorisation and a consequent down-
playing of historico-discursive possibilities and the potential for more radical forms of 
hegemonic intervention and resistance. In this context, the paper argues that it 
becomes possible to move beyond the usual deadlock of psychoanalysis and 





The Real, Ideology and (virtual) Reality 
 
 In Lacanian thought the concept of the Real is crucial. According to Žižek the 
Real constitutes ‘a substantial hard kernel that precedes and resists symbolisation and, 
simultaneously, it designates the left-over, which is posited or ‘produced’ by 
symbolisation itself’ (1993: 36). The Real precedes symbolisation in the sense that any 
symbolic order must be carved out of a bewildering array of possibilities that would 
overturn/negate that order. What we call ‘objectivity’, therefore, is always a symbolic 
order, which is constituted against the threat of infinite otherness (the Real). At the 
same time, in attempting to establish affirming limits against otherness, the symbolic 
order also produces its other, which returns in the Real to distort that order (e.g. the 
paranoid concern with infidelity in the construction of chastity). 
 Moreover the Real is not simply an external threat (in a spatial sense) but 
crucially irrupts within the symbolic itself (e.g. Freudian slips, failures in 
communication, etc.). The Oklahoma bombing is a case in point. And here perhaps we 
could say that there were two types of  ‘explosion’: one symbolic, the other Real. The 
first type was seen to be the consequence of an external threat (Islamic terrorism) and 
to some extent was ‘anticipated’ insofar as it exploded in a ‘place’ already made for it: 
the symbolic construction of threatened America. However later revelations, that the 
bombing had been carried out by a member of the right-wing gun lobby, sent out 
much deeper shockwaves. The source of this trauma was not only that such an atrocity 
could be carried out by a fellow American but one who, to some extent, was the 
‘product’ of a certain logic of middle Americanism: the historical freedom and 
democratic right to bear arms and defend oneself (etc.). This is the point at which, 
borrowing a phrase from Marx, the Real irrupts within the symbolic as  ‘the unreason 
of reason itself’. 
 Thus although symbolisation is a process which attempts to structure and 
organise the Real it can never fully achieve this. As Žižek puts it, ‘the Real is the rock 
upon which every attempt at symbolisation stumbles’ (1989: 169). The failure of 
symbolisation is a point at which the Real is experienced as an unrepresentable 
traumatic event. The ‘function’ of symbolisation, therefore, is to work ceaselessly to 
prevent the horrifying condition of lack/trauma in the Real from emerging. At the 
same time the Real is also constitutive of reality as ‘the lack around which the 
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symbolic order is structured’ (1989: 170). In this sense, the Real is both the primal 
condition of possibility and impossibility for all objectivity.3 
 On these grounds a crucial Lacanian formulation is that reality ‘cannot 
reproduce itself without (the) so-called ideological mystification’ (1989: 28). Reality, 
in fact, is always an ideological construction that provides a (perishable) screen 
against the distorting and traumatising effects of the Real. As Žižek explains: 
 ‘Ideology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape insupportable 
reality; in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for 
our ‘reality’ itself: an ‘illusion’ which structures our effective, real social relations and 
thereby masks some insupportable, real, impossible kernel...The function of ideology 
is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality 
itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel’ (1989: 45) 
 What ideology offers is the symbolic construction of reality itself, as the 
ultimate fantasy, against the traumatic effects of an eternally corrosive Real. Reality, 
therefore, is always a ‘virtual’ take on the Real; a virtuality that is haunted by an 
essential impotence: an incapacity to complete, to find the missing signifiers and 
deliver us from the Real.4 At the same time, if reality is haunted by impotency it also 
produces the fantasy of a successful exorcism. This may be seen at the point of social 
antagonism whereby a concrete identity comes to ‘embody’ the very lack and 
immanent impossibility of the Real itself.  
 Žižek illustrates this argument in relation to anti-Semitism and the ideological 
construction of ‘the Jew’. In Nazi discourse the Jew comes to embody the 
fundamental blockage which prevents society from establishing itself as a fully 
integrated whole: the fantasy ‘but for the Jews we would have social harmony and the 
riches we deserve.’ Thus the Jew constitutes ‘a point at which social negativity as 
such assumes positive existence’ (1989: 127). In this way the universal experience of 
social antagonism - and the traumatic and ontological failure of symbolisation - is 
projected onto, and is constitutive of, the particular identity of ‘Jew’: 
 ‘Society is not prevented from achieving its full identity because of Jews: it is 
prevented by its own antagonistic nature, by its own immanent blockage, and it 
‘projects’ this internal negativity into the figure of the ‘Jew’. In other words, what is 
excluded from the symbolic (from the frame of the corporatist socio-symbolic order) 
returns in the Real as a paranoid construction of the ‘Jew’’ (1989: 127). 
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 The fact that ‘Jews’ could not be integrated into the Nazi community was 
symptomatic of the transcendental condition of the impossibility of the full realisation 
of Identity: the fantasy of subjugating the Real and mastering history within a 
transparent symbolic order. Or as Žižek puts it, ‘Society does not exist; and the Jew is 




Theft, Enjoyment and Fear of Dinosaurs  
 
 In every attempt to command the social terrain - to create an antagonism-free 
new order - various culprits are identified and made responsible for the original loss, 
or theft, of the fantastical object: Society, Harmony, Salvation, etc. Indeed the very 
construction(s) of the social might be understood as a never-ending attempt to solve 
the original ‘crime’: to identify who has possession of the lost/stolen objects that 
would enable the full realisation/representation of ‘us’. 
 In this connection the mark of ideology is not that it reflects, or conceals, 
something more solid - economic interests, human nature, etc. - but, on the contrary, 
that it attempts to conceal an existential void and the traumatic knowledge that it 
cannot be filled out or fully represented. More especially, ideology subsists in the 
fantasy of suturing the unsuturable by providing straw enemies - ‘fictional’ 
embodiments of a transcendental lack - which ‘if only they could be eliminated’ 
would enable the realisation of the holistic dream.5 The Lacanian perspective on 
ideology, therefore, is one that identifies its tautological character.6 As Žižek puts it, 
‘the real goal (of ideology) is the consistency of the ideological attitude itself’ (1989: 
84). In this way, ideology provides a fantastical solidity against the distorting presence 
of the Real.  At the same time,  Žižek argues that (apropos of Kant) ideology may be 
regarded as a sublime object insofar as it is through ideology itself that the very 
impossibility of a full representation of the Real is also experienced. 
 However, if ideology reveals any ‘substance’ at work it might be said to be the 
jouissance, or enjoyment, of tautology. This idea is elaborated by Žižek in respect to 
the constitution of nationhood: 
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 ‘The element which holds together a given community cannot be reduced to 
the point of symbolic identification: the bond linking together its members always 
implies a shared relationship toward a Thing, toward enjoyment incarnated.... If we 
are asked how we can recognise the presence of this Thing, the only consistent answer 
is that the Thing is present in that elusive entity called our ‘way of life’. All we can do 
is enumerate disconnected fragments of the way our community organises its feasts, 
its rituals of mating, its initiation ceremonies, in short, all the details by which is made 
visible the unique way a community organises its enjoyment’ (1993: 201). 
 The Nation as a jouissance-Thing cannot finally be explained or represented 
within nationalist discourse. The latter, however, constantly alludes to the Thing - 
underlines its existence - and ‘promises’ its full realisation. The paradoxical qualities 
of the Thing may be illustrated with Terry Gilliam’s film Time Bandits. Here the 
protagonists are lured to an infernal game show with the promise of ‘the most 
fantastic object in the world’. This object, of course, is never revealed. However, each 
mundane substitute - cooker, refrigerator, microwave, etc. - only serves to underline 
its existence and to drive the desire for it. Similarly the narrative of Pulp Fiction is 
ultimately constructed around a lost/stolen object inside a case which must be 
retrieved and returned by Vincent and Jules. This object cannot be seen, it is only 
alluded to in the reflective glow of the protagonists’ faces. Thus, this ‘object’ - 
without any substantiality - becomes the very illumination/reflection of the possessive 
desire itself. 
        The Thing, therefore, may be regarded as a lost mythical object, permanently 
obscure, which has to be found in the Real and which drives the symbolic-fantasy 
process to secure its impossible representation. To this effect, the Thing is located at a 
point at which the meaning(s) of the nationalist discourse collapses in upon itself - and 
thereby shows its tautological character - and, so to speak, reveals the surplus 
enjoyment in the act of inscription itself (i.e. the sense of national duty, honour, 
belonging, etc.). 
 In this regard, Žižek is critical of the perspective of deconstruction and its 
attempt to ‘dissolve every substantial identity into a network of non-substantial, 
differential relations’ (1989: 72). In respect to the nation, for example, Žižek argues 
that such an emphasis ‘overlooks the remainder of some real, non-discursive kernel of 
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enjoyment which must be present for the Nation qua discursive entity-effect to 
achieve its ontological consistency’ (1993: 202). 
 Taking up the argument of Jacques-Alain Miller (1985), Žižek reminds us that 
it is the defensive posture taken in regard to the Thing which is at the root of racism 
and national antagonisms: 
 ‘What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the National 
Thing. We always impute to the ‘other’ an excessive enjoyment: he wants to steal our 
enjoyment (by ruining our way of life) and/or he has access to some secret perverse 
enjoyment. In short what really bothers us about the ‘other’ is the peculiar way he 
organises his enjoyment, precisely the surplus, the ‘excess’ that pertains to this way: 
the smell of ‘their’ food, ‘their’ noisy songs and dances, ‘their’ attitude to work. To 
the racist, the ‘other’ is either a workaholic stealing our jobs or an idler living on our 
labour.... The basic paradox is that our Thing is conceived as something inaccessible 
to the other and at the same time threatened by him’ (1993: 202-03). 
 The ‘other’, who can never be like ‘us’ and is permanently excluded from 
sharing our Thing, nevertheless wants to steal our special stuff: to dilute, or in 
Thatcher’s words, to ‘swamp’ It. The central paradox is that ‘(w)hat we conceal by 
imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never 
possessed what was allegedly stolen from us’ (1993: 203). 
 The threat by the other is not simply that she presumes to raid our jouissance-
Thing, but also that the very existence of the other’s enjoyment perturbs and fascinates 
us.7 In particular, it is the sexual enjoyment of the other which is most worrying and 
fascinating. On the one hand, this manifests itself in the fear/allure of abandoning 
oneself (e.g. racial identity, sexual identity, social responsibility, etc.) to the 
mysterious enjoyment of the other - the well known themes of potent blacks, 
fornicating Jews, exotic Orientals, over-sexed lesbians and gays (etc.). At another 
level this manifests itself in the fear of the reproductive capacities of the other and 
their ‘demographic time-bomb’ (Catholics, Moslems, Blacks, Palestinians, etc.). 
 Steven Spielberg’s Jurassic Park is instructive. In the film Richard 
Attenborough’s showman has re-animated dinosaurs from their state of fossilisation to 
place them in the ultimate theme park (the symbolic). And then one dark night the 
dinosaurs break out (the return of the Real). The revelatory horror, however, is that 
despite all the best available technological expertise and methods in controlling sexual 
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reproduction, the dinosaurs - as embodiments of the wild untameable jouissance of 
nature - find a way to reproduce themselves independently of ‘us’. This presents a 
much deeper threat against which the universal prototypical (white) family is 
constituted as the guardians of ‘our’ enjoyment. The paradoxical message of the film 
might be: ‘not only are dinosaurs extinct, you can’t even trust them!’ And this, of 
course, is homologous with numerous racist sentiments of the type: ‘not only are 
blacks inferior, they threaten the dissolution of our entire way of life.’ 
 It is this paranoia in the attempt to regulate/suppress the ‘surplus’ enjoyment of 
the (reproducing) other which drives ethnic antagonisms and is simultaneously fuelled 
by it. In one of its more extreme forms, it is revealed in the systematic rape of Moslem 
women in ex-Yugoslavia. Not only does this rape take away the woman’s dignity and 
her sense of herself (see R.Salecl, 1994) it also involves a more general theft of the 
sexual/reproductive enjoyment of the Moslem community as such. Rape in this sense 
becomes an intrusion into, and defilement of, the very ‘source’ of the other’s 
enjoyment (i.e. rape as pillage): ‘how can they enjoy themselves after this?’ This 
calculation is an annihilation beyond rape/death: a shattering of a community’s 
enjoyment so that it cannot re-make itself. 
 However, on this last point we would argue that Žižek has not paid sufficient 
attention to the way in which national communities are not only defensive in relation 
to their Thing but are also active in attempting to colonise/consume the secret 
treasure, or agalma, of the other. In this regard we might say that the Thing is not only 
a tautological distillation of metastatic enjoyment,8 it also makes a gesture to the 
universal (revealing a constant interplay between the particular and the universal). The 
manifestations of the Thing are paradoxically evangelical: ‘our civilisation is a 
universal good, but you can never fully imitate or be fully part of it’. The Thing, 
therefore, also involves a kind of directive to bear witness, to go forth and colonise by 
providing ‘us’ with a superior ‘passport’. This passport from the Thing (‘I’m an 
American!’) has not only functioned as a literal licence to explore, discover, convert 
and colonise but is also evident in the contemporary explosion of ‘cultural tourism’ - 
the consumption of what is of real/authentic value in the various 
(ancient/ecological/thematic) regions of the world even though this may be ‘hidden’ 
from, or ‘unappreciated’ by, the inhabitants themselves (our Thing bestows 
sophistication, knowledge, sensibility, etc.). The other cannot penetrate/consume our 
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Thing because they have inferior, or ‘literal’, passports. Indeed, many black people in 
Britain have experienced the frustration of not possessing the real/magical passport 
behind the British passport (they are frequently asked to produce their passports 
precisely because ‘we know they don’t possess the real passport’). Indeed, under the 
terms of the British Nationality Act (and various pieces of subsequent legislation), we 
have the official determination of peripheral forms of belonging - lower levels of 
‘Britishness’ - in which ‘fake’ passports are solemnly issued to people from the 
former colonies. The idea of a British passport that has the built-in proviso of ‘stay 
put’ or ‘stay elsewhere’ is, of course, rich with Kafkean absurdity. 
 An early example of symbolic colonisation can be found in the well-known 
tale of Rumpelstiltskin. In this tale we have the figure of an excluded other - a dwarf - 
who is able to spin gold out of straw for an aspiring princess (in this sense the dwarf 
may be considered to represent immigrant labour). However, in exchange for this 
service the princess must give up her first-born child to him. Immediately we see the 
threat posed by the dwarf’s surplus enjoyment - what does he want with the child? 
What is his desire? (This is the Lacanian Che vuoi?) - which again insinuates itself in 
the domain of sexuality/reproduction. In the nick of time, however, the princess 
discovers his real name - the hidden signifier which is the source of his power and 
enjoyment: his essential jouissance-Thing - and the threat of the desirous other is 
vanquished as the dwarf, in an act of symbolic castration, pulls off his leg in rage and 
disappears into the distance. 
 What we see in the tale, therefore, is a process of colonisation by re-presenting 
the other in a way, which becomes acceptable to ‘us’ (i.e. devoid of threat/challenge). 
This, of course, is the shamanism at the root of racist name-calling: identifying the 
inferior reality of ‘their’ forms of enjoyment. Representation, in this sense, may be 
seen as a form of symbolic ‘castration’ in attempting to dissolve the power of the 
other (and, more generally, the power of the Real: i.e. to ‘castrate’ the original 
‘castration’ of the Real itself). In this way, the other is reduced to an ontological 
description, devoid of the power of metaphor and unable to describe 'us'.9 
 The racist paradox, however, is that we must be constantly vigilant against the 
impotency and the inferiority of the other. This again is illustrated in Jurassic Park, 
and much of the horror genre, where fossilisation (acceptable representation) is, in 
fact, a dormant menace: ‘just when you thought they were a fossil they are at their 
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most dangerous’. What if Rumpelstiltskin returns - like Freddie Krueger - with a new 
secret signifier which re-animates the threat of his surplus enjoyment? 
 This also reveals the original ‘impotence’ of representation: the more it 
identifies the more impotent it becomes; the more it tries to establish a total 
representation the more it fears it has not done so (this is why totalitarian regimes tend 
to collapse under the weight of their own paranoia: i.e. they cannot achieve 
Totalitarianism and the paranoia eventually ‘produces’ the threat/dissent they fear 
most). This is the ‘psychosis’ within the structure of all reality: the drive to represent 
the unrepresentable and the impenetrable jouissance of the beyond of reality 
 
 
The Decline of Britain 
Mr Poffenheimer and the Body-Snatchers 
 
 What is missing in the more familiar debates about the ‘decline of Britain’ (see 
A.Gamble, 1981) is a consideration of its phantasmic dimension - particularly in 
relation to the idea of  ‘loss’ (e.g. Empire, the industrial spirit, Britain’s greatness, 
etc.) - and the way it has been variously ‘projected’ in the constitution of the nation. 
Here psychoanalytic theory makes an important contribution. 
 The themes of theft and enjoyment are clearly visible in the reactivation of 
British nationalism from the 1960s onwards. After the trauma of the Suez crisis, 
continuing economic decline and the corresponding (and unthinkable) rise of 
European and other nations - viz. those ‘who had lost the war’ (Japan and Germany), 
those ‘who had been rescued by us’ (France and Western Europe), and those ‘who had 
not suffered like we had’ (the USA) - Britain was undergoing a widespread identity 
crisis. 
 In a revealing article entitled ‘Reviving Poffenheimer’, The Economist 
addressed the issue of decline in the context of Britain’s cultural baggage. The journal 
argued: ‘A main reason for our recent disappointment lies in the borderland between 
economics and national psychology: British manufacturers, representing in this the 
ethos of the British people, have not put so determined an effort into selling their 
goods abroad as European manufacturers have done’ (1960: 245) 
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 The reason for this it argued was a kind of easy-going snobbery that was 
peculiarly, and forgivably, British.10 By contrast ‘foreigners’, without the burden of 
heritage, social status and cultural sophistication were able to achieve increasing 
economic success (albeit of a purely quantitative kind: the idea of qualitative success 
would also have been unthinkable). The high achievement of foreigners, therefore, 
was the result of the fact that they did not possess the excess baggage of tradition or 
the cultural richness of Britain. Their enjoyment was totally inferior and yet at the 
same time - indeed because of this - it posed an enormous threat to our enjoyment (our 
just desserts, economic reward for national sacrifice, etc.). This paradoxical 
construction is given expression in Graham Greene’s description of a foreign trader’s 
dinner in Havana: 
 ‘The Germans formed a group apart, rather suitably against the West wall; they 
carried the superiority of the deutschmark on their features like duelling scars: 
national honour which had survived Belsen depended now on a rate of exchange’ 
(1962: 170) 
 More recently, of course, this type of sentiment persists in the intense 
deliberations over the activities of the Bundesbank in the European Union and the 
whole issue of German reunification/expansionism. Again the Lacanian Che vuoi? 
‘what is their real agenda?’; ‘can we trust them?’; ‘how far will German 
desire/ambition go?’ And, of course, underlying this is the view that Germans may be 
successful but they have to remain German: to bear the indelible stain of Belsen which 
the mighty Deutsche Mark tries to conceal (a substitute for inferior national 
enjoyment). 
 Against this background, The Economist characterised the parvenu threat from 
the international economy in terms of a fictitious stereotype called ‘Mr Poffenheimer’. 
All richness of identity is immediately subsumed under the patronising sobriquet of 
Poffenheimer who is clearly foreign, pushy and (given the name root) Jewish; skilfully 
combining a set of equivalences between anti-Semitism and a more general anti-
German/European/American xenophobia). More particularly, Poffenheimer is 
described as a ‘go getter, an orthodox and established worshipper of the Almighty 
dollar, the sort of chap that better-class Britons devoutly hoped that they would not be 
obliged to invite to dinner.’ (1960: 246). 
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 Here again we see elements of the Rumpelstiltskin myth. Poffenheimer can 
make gold, and is to be admired for that, but he can never become part of ‘our’ 
community or be one of ‘us’. We can fully identify him, penetrate his inferior 
enjoyment (material wealth, ambition, etc.) and thereby locate/steal his Dasein. Thus 
the threat he poses is (partially) dissolved in finding his ‘real’ name, his secret sign: he 
cannot be anything other than a Poffenheimer, no matter what he does. 
 However, The Economist is even more interesting in its prognosis for halting 
decline and rebuilding Britain: 
 ‘The need there is to mobilise the dynamic of an economic nationalism...The 
policy must be to produce a new race of Poffenheimers - giving to them only the 
honours, the royal handshakes, the social kudos which a snobbish society can bestow’ 
(1960: 246) 
 Again this is a paradox. In order to protect/reproduce the enjoyment of a 
British way of life ‘we’ had to become more like Poffenheimers. This involved the 
production of a kind of ‘double agency’ which was not simply a duality but an 
articulated identity which would enable the British to steal the enjoyment of 
Poffenheimers and thereby restore ‘Britishness’. And, in this regard, we see a reversal 
of Žižek’s formulation of the infiltrating ‘body-snatching’ other (1989: 89). Britons, in 
order to preserve their way of life, would have to infiltrate the identity of 
Poffenheimers - to become the body snatchers (or jouissance thieves) themselves - in 
order to affirm difference. Indeed, in a campaigning role, The Economist launched its 
own project in the 1960s called ‘Spies for Prosperity’ - actively invoking this kind of 
double agency - in which journalists and businessmen were encouraged to ‘spy’ for 
Britain (steal the best ideas/techniques, etc.) in order to restore the national economy. 
What enables the British to do this, of course, is their magical passport from the 
Thing; a passport which bestows the gift of infinite mutability (to be like 
Poffenheimers, etc.) and infinite immutability (to bear witness as part of an inimitable 
theft-proof culture).11  
 If we look at the question of decline in the present conjuncture then we can see 
that various culprits have been identified (and sometimes combined) as responsible for 
the loss of Britain’s ‘Greatness’. In the ‘two nations’ discourses of Thatcherism and 
Majorism, for example, a whole range of figures - ‘over-powerful’ trade unions, 
‘officious Eurocrats’, single mothers, 1960s ‘decadence’, black people, lesbians and 
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gays, travellers (etc.) - were made responsible for thwarting the development of ‘UK II 
- Britain Great Again’.12  With Blair’s  ‘one nation’ discourse, on the other hand, the 
attempt to embody an impossible universality around ‘New Labour, New Britain’ also 
proceeds through a set of exclusions (not least within the Labour party itself). Some of 
these (constitutive) exclusions are already very familiar in, for example, the 
stigmatising of ‘single mothers’ as a dependent burden on the welfare state; a state 
which, in turn, occupies an ambiguous position in contemporary liberal-democratic 
discourse. 
The paradoxical quality of the welfare state is well captured in an episode from 
Time Bandits in which  John Cleese’s Robin Hood is concerned to re-distribute wealth 
to the peasants with aristocratic benediction. At the very moment of receiving, 
however, each peasant is summarily clobbered by one of Hood’s cronies. When Hood, 
who is clearly puzzled by this, inquires as to whether the violence is absolutely 
necessary he is informed that it is and the process continues in the same way as before. 
 The same movement of the invisible hand between provision and punishment 
is clearly apparent in the system of welfare (what Tony Blair calls ‘compassion with a 
hard edge’) and in a way which hystericises/divides the subject. But this 
hystericisation is the result of an opposite process to the one identified in Copjec’s 
analysis of democracy. Copjec identifies the basic paradox of liberal democracy as 
being one where the particularity of the individual, contained in the right to vote, is 
immediately annulled in the expression of that right where it is transformed into an 
abstract statistic (1994, p.150). To this effect, the subject of democracy is constantly 
‘divided between the signifiers that seek to name it (universal franchise) and the 
enigma that refuses to be named (individual particularity)’ (1994, p.150). In welfarist 
discourse, by contrast, while individuals can receive benefits on the basis of universal 
welfare rights, in the very act of exercising those rights it is the particularity of the 
individual which eliminates the former as s/he is made responsible for their own 
circumstances (‘You are an Individual’, as the New Deal posters declare). Thus at the 
moment of recognising the universal validity of welfare recipiency this is immediately 
repressed as it ‘re-empowers’ the subject through a discourse of guilt and individual 
responsibility. Such a discourse is deeply embedded in the inquisitorial practices of 
the welfare and unemployment agencies: ‘are you actively looking for work?’, ‘what 
have you been doing to find work?’, ‘what else do you think you could do?’, ‘what 
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alternatives would you consider?’ (and so on, as an equivalential series of questions 
whose central purpose, independently of content, is to affirm individual culpability 
and the authority of the gaze). In this connection the authoritarian nature of the big 
Other does not lie with it being a rigid orthodoxy in possession of all the answers but, 
on the contrary, with its critical posture in possession of all the questions 13 (see A. 
Bodenheimer, 1984).  
The essential issue at stake is the belief in the power of the big Other as an 
embodiment of interrogative mastery: it’s as if outside every welfare and 
unemployment agency there is an invisible sign which reads, ‘We know that liberal-
democratic-capitalism fails, but you must not believe that this is because of liberal-
democratic- capitalism’. This is exemplified in the perspective of Blair on single 
mothers: ‘We want single mothers…at least to visit a Job Centre, not just stay at home 
waiting for the benefit cheque every week…’ (Labour Party Conference, Sept.30th, 
1997). In other words, while we sympathise with the circumstances of single mothers, 
they must nevertheless be made to believe that this is not the fault of the system and 
that they are ultimately responsible. In this regard, it is indicative of a secular form of 
Pascalian theology, the imposition of a regime of ideological ritual (visits to job 
centres, etc.), designed to bring about a belief in the authority of the system and 
obeisance to the doctrine of individual culpability. As the object of so much attention, 
and so little influence, disaffected groups like single mothers are therefore caught up 
in a curious paradox: it is their very powerlessness, insofar as they reflect the failure 
of the system and symbolise its impotence, that poses such a radical threat to the 
authority of the big Other. And here we see an opposite paradox to that of the 
Lacanian phallus. While the phallus is ultimately a signifier of its own lack, with 
single mothers it is their very lack (of social integration) which presents an immediate 
challenge to the big Other. 
Similarly, major questions have been raised recently about the problem of a 
nebulous and indefinable ‘underclass’  (an equivalential assortment of ‘social failures’ 
constituting an ideological unity around ‘not us’). In particular, the stubborn 
persistence of an ‘underclass’ - with its mysterious, and self-reproducing, enjoyment 
of drugs, ‘recreational crime’, alternative language, ‘anti-family’ values (etc.) - has 
been made responsible for the general theft of a successful and fully integrated 
society. In Britain, the fear of the underclass has been recently mobilised through the 
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widespread image of ‘dogs with attitude’ (Pit-Bull Terriers, Rotweillers, etc.) roaming 
estates and symbolising the untameable jouissance of the underclass which refuses to 
be integrated into the socio-symbolic order and which, therefore, must be castrated. To 
this effect, we see how the underclass crucially performs the role of ‘non-society’ in 
order for ‘society’ to exist.14 
 However, it is precisely on the question of the continuous subversions and 
interplay between society and non-society, and between the hegemonic processes of 
filling and emptying, that the very compelling perspective of Žižek encounters certain 
problems of theoretical rigidity. These problems, we would argue, can be successfully 





Politics, Deconstruction and Radical Democracy 
 
 In addressing the problems of nationalist excess the perspective of Žižek 
appears unduly circumspect with regard to its general prognosis. In particular, this 
paper argues that in Žižek there exists an artificial limiting of political possibilities 
which can only be transcended by moving beyond ‘the traumatic relationship between 
Derrida and Lacan’ (1994: 193) and establishing a new perspective which combines 
the positive insights of both deconstruction and psychoanalysis.15 In addition, it is 
argued that such a perspective must crucially be supplemented by a theory of politics 
and hegemony. 
 A useful starting point is the treatment of the idea of the sovereign and that of 
democracy in Žižek. Following the argument of Lefort (1988), the defining feature of 
democracy is taken to be that its locus of power is an ‘empty place’ (1989: 147). By 
contrast the King - which Žižek derives from Hegel - is seen to completely fill this 
empty place. In this way, the King is reduced to a pure functionary - as an empty 
signifier - whose very lack of particular content enables him to represent the totality of 
society: ‘the State as the rational totality exists effectively only in so far as it is 
embodied in the inert presence of the King’s body’ (1989: 184). Thus a total 
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representation of the social is made possible through the total emptiness of the 
signifier (the ‘idiotic body of the Monarch’ as a kind of regal mannequin). 
 From the perspective of the theory of deconstruction, however, such a situation 
never obtains. In Derridean terms, there is always an element of the remainder - in 
which case a signifier cannot be completely empty - such that all signification is 
essentially ‘impure’ and prone to distortion through iteration.16 In the case of the 
King, therefore, the concrete individual is never totally eliminated in such a 
representation. The historical particularity of the royal personage will always have 
some unique (iterable) effect, which contaminates and distorts the universality of the 
sovereign function.17 Conversely, in the case of democracy, power can never be a 
completely empty place (even during elections). While, in the absence of the 
sovereign, there is certainly a process of emptying there will always be relative forms 
of structuration, which convey the particularity of those communities attempting to 
embody a democratic universality. 
 Thus what is absent in both Žižek and Lefort is a conception of the partial 
processes of emptying and filling which can never be finally resolved. In the terms of 
Laclau and Mouffe, we are always operating on the terrain of hegemony in which a 
particularity attempts to carry out the impossible task of representing a universality or 
fullness. By drawing on the insights of deconstruction and hegemony, therefore, an 
alternative perspective can be developed which opens greater possibilities for political 
and subversive practices than Žižek appears willing to allow. And here a different 
approach to the question of nationalism and radical politics presents itself.  
 Using the same type of argument as before, Žižek asserts that in nationalism 
the empty place of the Thing is filled out by the Nation (1993: 221-22). As we have 
seen, the notion of a completely empty place and its total occupation is a false one. 
Moreover, when we look at actual cases of nationalism, a far more complex picture of 
(undecidable) interplay and competing hegemonic representations emerges. The 
construction of Palestinian nationalism is a relevant example, which has been well 
documented by E. Said (1986). Here we see how a number of different groups - 
religious, secular, military, cultural (etc.) - compete (and, at times, openly conflict) 
with each other in the attempt to fill out the idea of Palestine. Thus the ‘nation’ is not 
simply given as a Thing of enjoyment; rather it exists as a dynamic and inherently 
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unstable terrain of political constitution (with competing forms of ‘national 
enjoyment’ and  ‘ways of life’). 
 Similar problems are encountered in Žižek’s thesis that the very framework of 
liberal democracy (in its international dimension) tends to produce nationalist closure 
as its ‘inherent opposite’ (1993: 220). In the case of Britain, for example, we can 
immediately see how various kinds of nationalist discourse have been articulated 
within its liberal democratic framework (see S. Hall’s analysis of Thatcherism in Hall 
and Jacques (eds.), 1983). More generally, however, Žižek appears to overlook the 
extent to which the particularity of a national closure is contaminated by a universality 
which distorts and supersedes it - and thereby prevents (ontologically) a total 
representation or filling out in its own terms.18 In this sense - and this point has been 
well made by Ernesto Laclau (1992) - the universal may be said to grow out of the 
particular. Thus, with any form of nationalism, we can see how the particularism is 
always linked to the universality of a set of ‘rights’ to self-determination, autonomy, 
equality (etc.) which transcends any nationalist closure. And in this regard, the latter 
can always subvert and modify the former, in a more radical way, through a 
hegemonic operation. To this effect we could say that the very deconstructability of 
the relationship between the particular and the universal is something which inscribes 
the essential possibility of a politics of doubt and transformation such that all forms of 
national enjoyment and ways of life can be ultimately drawn into question and 
modified. 
 From this point of view, Žižek’s analysis of liberal democracy, especially with 
regard to its potential for radical subversion, appears rather underdeveloped. His 
critique of liberal democracy is elaborated in the following way: ‘The problem with 
the liberal democracy is that a priori, for structural reasons, it cannot be universalized. 
Hegel said that the moment of victory of a political force is the very moment of its 
splitting: the triumphant liberal-democratic ‘new world order’ is more and more 
marked by a frontier separating its ‘inside’ from its ‘outside’’ (1993: 222). 
 Moreover, when Žižek refers to the ‘liberal-democratic framework’ it is clear 
that he actually means ‘liberal-democratic capitalism’ (1993: 220). For Žižek, liberal 
democracy is fundamentally linked to the logic of capital in a ‘vicious circle of late-
capitalist Spinozism’ (1993: 219), which because of its exclusivist nature tends to 
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produce fundamentalism and nationalism. Žižek’s solution (which is not very fully 
developed) is the following: 
 ‘The way to break out of this vicious circle is not to fight the ‘irrational’ 
nationalist particularism but to invent forms of political practice that contain a 
dimension of universality beyond Capital; their exemplary case today, of course, is the 
ecological movement’ (1993: 220) 
 There are a number of difficulties with this perspective. A first observation is 
that the existence of an exclusivist frontier is not peculiar to liberal democracy. The 
construction of any political order - if it is to perform its ordering function - will 
always be constitutively split between its ‘inside’ and its ‘outside’, between its ‘we’ 
and its ‘them’.19 
 More important, however, is Žižek’s conceptualisation of liberal democracy. 
And here we see an opposite problem to that which we find in Rorty.20 Whereas Rorty 
feels obliged to defend, in toto, all the ‘institutions and practices of the rich North 
Atlantic democracies’ (1983: 584), Žižek is concerned to negate/displace the liberal-
democratic-capitalist totality with a genuine and inclusive universalism (e.g. the 
ecological movement). Both positions are unsatisfactory. The point is rather to see 
how the different elements - liberal, democratic, capitalism - have been put together, 
in an undecidable manner, as an eminently political  construction (and not a Spinozist 
totality).21 In this way it becomes possible to radicalise and extend the democratic 
element - as it is possible to deepen the universalist dimension of democracy that is 
present in a nationalist particularism - beyond its existing configuration and to 
establish an alternative hegemonic formation. Indeed the dangers of not fighting, and 
of simply disengaging from the political terrain in the hope of inventing a genuine 
counter-model of universality, are all too apparent in the way in which socialist 
internationalists failed to politically engage with the fascism of interwar Germany.22 
Thus it cannot be a question of counterposing the ‘bad’ and ‘false’ universalism of 
liberal democracy with the ‘good’ and ‘true’ universalism of the ecological movement 
(as if there were intrinsic connections here). On the contrary, it is a question of 
critiquing the myth of a naturalistic unity on which both are based and, thereby, to 
develop a more interventionist and radical politics of subversion and hegemonic 
recomposition rather than universalist displacement. 
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 A similar kind of absolutist tendency is present in Žižek’s analysis of the 
contemporary mutations in social and political subjectivity: 
 ‘Far from containing any kind of subversive potentials, the dispersed, plural, 
constructed subject hailed by post-modern theory (the subject prone to particular, 
inconsistent modes of enjoyment, etc.) simply designates the form of subjectivity that 
corresponds to late capitalism. Perhaps the time has come to resuscitate the Marxian 
insight that Capital is the ultimate power of ‘deterritorialisation’ which undermines 
every fixed social identity, and to conceive of ‘late capitalism’ as the epoch in which 
the traditional fixity of ideological positions (patriarchal authority, fixed sexual roles, 
etc.) becomes an obstacle to the unbridled commodification of everyday life.’ (1993: 
216 - original emphasis) 
 Now while it is certainly true that ‘post-modern’ forms of subjectivity are not 
necessarily subversive, this does not consequently mean that they necessarily do not 
have any subversive potential (despite his critique of the theory of interpellation, this 
appears to savour far too strongly of a kind of Althusserian functionalism). There can 
be no doubt that the logic of commodification generates a widening set of dislocations 
and antagonisms around which new identifications are made. But to simply reduce the 
latter to the former would be a mistake. Indeed if we take Žižek’s own example of the 
ecological movement we can see that while this has been ‘generated’ by capitalist 
enterprise - pollution, the destruction of natural resources, etc. - it is, in many cases, 
wholly opposed to it. Thus the subversive potential of such dislocated identities 
subsists precisely in their undecidable character.23 In other words there is always an 
unbridgeable gap between a dislocated identity and its recomposition, which is the 
‘source’ of the political, and which allows for alternative forms of hegemonic 
constitution in opposition to capitalism and its logics.24 
 In general terms, therefore, we would argue that the perspective of Žižek, 
despite its many compelling insights, has a tendency to be unnecessarily restrictive in 
its conception of politics and, correspondingly, to be too absolutist in its response to 
the Lacanian identification of lack: there is an empty place which must be filled out by 
a master signifier (the King, liberal-democratic-capitalism, the ecological movement, 
etc.) which will codify all subsequent forms of identification. However, it is clear that 
between the extremes of Universality/Particularity and emptiness/fullness there are 
wider deconstructive possibilities for subversive and hegemonic practices. In 
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particular, an alternative perspective presents itself, which combines the Lacanian 
insight of a constitutive lack with a more positive approach to politics. Such a 
perspective would be one that does not simply ‘tarry with the negative’ but actively 
conjures with negativity as such. 
 This type of approach has been crucial to the development of the idea of 
‘radical democracy’ as elaborated in the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985). The 
central insight here has been the identification of two movements which are ultimately 
contradictory but which, at the same time, sustain the possibility of democracy 
through the very impossibility of any resolution. On the one hand there exists the 
attempt by various groups in a democratic framework to realise the fullness of society 
(to fill the ‘empty place’) through the development of a particular political project. On 
the other hand there is a second movement which involves the recognition that such a 
realisation is always impossible and that the happy hour of total fulfilment never 
comes. Radical democracy, therefore, subsists in this constitutive interplay: that 
between the (false) extremes of the total possibility/impossibility of the fullness of 
society there exists a plurality of partial and provisional hegemonic projects which 
attempt to perform the filling function. 
 Now this clearly goes beyond the Žižekian perspective of attempting a total 
concealment of the constitutive lack. The attempt by a group/individual to bring about 
an effect of concealment can only be seen in purely artificial and provisional terms: as 
a ‘strategic essentialism' , which tries to constitute the impossible object. In this way, 
radical democracy is able to build into its ‘vision’ the very sense of its own 
incompletion and incompletability as a positive feature of its political culture.25 Thus 
while radical democracy, like all political projects, is a power construct which seeks to 
establish some kind of closure, at the same time - and unlike other political projects - 
it is one which actively conjures with its impossibility and potential for 
transformation; in Derrida’s terms, it remains alive to the promise of  a democracy ‘to 
come’.  
 At the same time, however, the Derridean  perspective raises crucial questions 
about the status of this ‘to come’ (à venir) which, it is argued here, cannot be 
adequately answered within the terms of deconstruction itself. Throughout Specters of 
Marx Derrida  speaks of this à venir in terms of a general obligation to be open to the 
other in order to sustain the emancipatory promise of an always-becoming of justice 
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and democracy. This markedly contrasts with Žižek where the emphasis tends to be on 
otherness as a focused projection of immanent loss. For Derrida, the relationship to 
otherness is a far more fluid one of continuous development and exchange with 
disquietude over existing certainties. It is in this sense that Derrida develops the logic 
of spectrality in terms of an essential (hauntological) undecidability between flesh and 
spirit (1994: 6 & 126). All being is ultimately a matter of ‘trade’ with a ‘commerce of 
spectres’ (1994: 8). It is precisely because there is always an undecidability  between 
the particular embodiments of flesh and the universal possibilities of spirit 
transcending the latter that Derrida affirms a fundamental obligation/debt to the ghosts 
of the past, present and future. For Derrida the ghost invigilates the impossibility of a 
final closure and, at the same time, bears witness to an emancipatory promise of the 
future: ‘If he loves justice at least, the “scholar” of the future, the “intellectual” of 
tomorrow should learn it and from the ghost. He should learn to live by learning not 
how to make conversation with the ghost but how to talk with him, with her, how to 
let them speak or how to give them back speech, even if it is in oneself, in the other in 
oneself: they are always there, specters, even if they do not exist, even if they are no 
longer, even if they are not yet’ (1994: 176).26  
But here it appears that Derrida has attempted to resolve matters too swiftly 
and we encounter an opposite problem to that which we find in Žižek: instead of an 
absolutist resolution of the political terrain, in Derrida there is an implicit tendency to 
affirm an openness to the radical heterogeneity of the other as the ‘ground’ of a more 
progressive ethics and politics. However, as Laclau has recently pointed out (1995) 
there is no relationship of necessity that can be automatically derived from 
deconstructive premises. If deconstruction is the assertion of an ultimate 
undecidability then it cannot be made the source of any decision or ethico-political 
imperative (it is perfectly possible to be a deconstructivist and a fascist). Similarly, it 
cannot be a question of an obligation to be open to the heterogeneity of the other 
simply because s/he is different (like Hannibal Lecter). Indeed, a democratic culture - 
if it is to remain democratic - will always have to impose a certain closure against 
anti-democratic otherness.27 Just as there is the promise of a democracy to come there 
is also always the threat/challenge of an opposing form of to come. While democratic 
transformation must undoubtedly pass through deconstruction (of the law, etc.) the 
latter does not guarantee the former. In this sense, deconstruction - in its affirmation of 
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a radical undecidability - needs to be supplemented with a political determination, 
which gives shape to democracy and the hegemonic constitution of its decisional 
framework. 
 Thus between Žižek and Derrida we could say that there are respective 
difficulties of too much and too little closure. The problem, therefore, is one of 
striking some kind of balance. And this returns us to the essential issue of politics: that 
of constructing frontiers between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, and the ‘we’ and the 
‘them’, of any social order. 
 The perspective of radical democracy, therefore, conjures differently with the 
arguments of Žižek and Derrida  and in  such a way that a positive development is 
effected which moves beyond the limitations of both. While radical democracy 
inscribes the notion of lack - and the avoidance of the Real - as constitutive of all 
order, this is not taken to constrain political activity to the filling of the empty place 
through absolutism or universalist dialectics. Wider subversive possibilities are 
conceived in the discursive interplay between emptying and filling and the universal 
and the particular. To this effect, a radical democratic approach would be one that 
actively developed a deconstructivist ‘sensibility’: i.e. a political culture that extends 
the principle of undecidability to wider areas of the social, and deepens the sense of 
responsibility to the other, beyond the legal and socio-political fixity of any order. At 
the same time, however, this sensibility would have to be constitutively balanced with 
a set of hegemonic determinations and exclusivist frontiers which would give radical 
democracy its historical consistency and enable it to sustain its democratic character 
against that which would overwhelm it.28 
In this connection it might be said that we arrive at something approaching a  
modus vivendi with the primal sense of lack. That is to say, in the hegemonic attempts 
to embody an impossible fullness, lack itself may be articulated as a positive feature of 
an ongoing political project of attempting to realise the promise of democracy. In this 
manner, a positive transcendence of the psychoanalysis/deconstruction opposition is 
envisaged in a way which not only enlarges the scope for political engagement but 
which underscores the very sense of the political in social relations. Such a 
transcendence would be perhaps, finally, reflected in the paradoxical jouissance of 






(1) Žižek clarifies this distinction in this way: ‘if we make an abstraction, if we 
subtract all the richness of the different modes of subjectivation, all the fullness of 
experience present in the way the individuals are ‘living’ their subject-positions, what 
remains is an empty place which was filled out with this richness; this original void, 
this lack of symbolic structure, is the subject, the subject of the signifier.  The subject 
is therefore to be strictly opposed to the effect of subjectivation: what subjectivation 
masks is not a pre- or trans- subjective process of writing but a lack in structure, a lack 
which is the subject’. (1989, p.175).  
Ridley Scott’s Bladerunner is informative in this connection. Using the ‘voigt-
kampff’ machine, Deckard interrogates Rachel at the Tyrell Corporation and tests her 
empathic responses. Rachel’s answers are slick and sure-fire and indicate well-
rounded subjectivation. The final question, however, leaves Rachel floundering in the 
real as she cannot find a point of identification and the machine registers a chilling 
wipe-out, the void of $. What is compelling about this scene is that, far from 
separating Rachel (and the other replicants) from ‘us’, it serves to underscore her 
human status as a being whose subjectivation is also prone to failure and the distorting 
effects of the real. Thus what is masked in this projection of failure onto Rachel and 
the replicants, is the traumatic knowledge that it is ‘us’ who cannot resolve the 
question of ‘who am I?’ (in an ultimate sense) or completely fill out the void of $. 
 
(2) Thus what is missing - or indeed denied - in the post-modern celebration of 
‘differences’, ‘hybridisation’, ‘multiple identities’, (etc.), is the deeper reality that 
individuals are driven towards identification/subjectification in order to resolve the 
uncertainty as to what they are for the other and to avoid falling into the traumatic real 
of  $. Graham Taylor, a previous England football manager, illustrates the point. In an 
interview, after a particularly disastrous game for England in the European 
championship, the manager could no longer contain his sense of dislocation and 
frustration  and ranted at the interviewer: ‘I’ll be whatever you want you want me to 
be. If you want me to be happy, I’ll be happy. If you want me to be sad, I’ll be 
sad….(and so on).’ In other words, against a background of intense public scrutiny 
and disappointment, Taylor could no longer resolve what he was for the other (‘I’ll be 
whatever you want me to be..’) and began to emerge in his condition as subject ($), 
the failure/breakdown of subjectivation, which resides in the traumatic ‘who am I?’ 
and to which all forms of identification, ultimately, are aimed at  
concealing/repressing. The same drive to resolve what the subject is for the other can 
be found in the repeated injunction in the song by Michael Jackson, following 
accusations of child abuse, of ‘stop questioning me!’.  
At the same time, the impossibility of finally resolving the gap between subject    
and subjectivation is the very condition of possibility for an ongoing history of 
identification and representation (the name for this gap, of course, is the political).  
This is why Žižek speaks of the subject as a ‘constitutive void’ and the ‘subject of the 
signifier’. 
 
(3) Again the point should be made here that ‘objectivity’ itself is always a symbolic 




(4) This gives a different spin to the debates on ‘virtual reality’ and the emphasis on a 
certain ‘blurring’ between the domains of actuality and artificiality. For Lacan, 
blurring is already inscribed in the very possibility of the experience of reality as such. 
Actual reality is always a representation, a virtualisation of the Real, which can only 
make sense within a determinate, and ideologically consistent, discursive matrix. C. 
Norris misses the broader point, therefore, in his castigation of ‘post-modern 
sophisticates’ in regard to the Gulf War (1992). While computer-generated imagery 
did at times  lend an air of ‘un-reality’ to the conflict, this does not mean, conversely, 
that we have a transparent access to the ‘real truth’. All war is ‘virtual’ in the sense 
that its meanings, ideas of ‘just-ness’, ‘crime’, ‘pity’, ‘humanity’ (etc.) have to be 
represented - whether through song, epic poetry, journalism, cartoons, computer 
imagery (etc.). In this regard there is nothing new about virtual reality: it is as old as 
the symbolic order itself and its ideological promise of a rule-bound graspable reality 
which fits our vocabulary, desires and expectations. 
 
(5)  The issue of ‘false memory syndrome’  is illuminating in this connection. In 
Lacanian terms this syndrome might be termed ‘false memory enjoyment’ whereby a 
‘cause’ is retroactively invented (the classic ‘future anterior’) for a set of ‘symptoms’. 
In recent psychotherapy, for example, the subject is ‘encouraged’ to find a 
cause/culprit (e.g. parental abuse) which would ‘explain’ his/her symptoms of 
depression, eating disorders (etc.) and thereby re-organise enjoyment in the symbolic 
(emotional relief, focused anger, projection, etc.). Such a memory-cause assumes a 
tenacious phantasmic potency in filling out the subject’s identity (‘now at last I 
understand myself/now I can liberate the real me...’). For what is truly horrific is not 
the memory-cause itself but the possibility that it might indeed be ‘false’: that the 
subject might be left with a cause-less set of symptoms which could not be explained 
or domesticated in the symbolic. This is underpinned by the ‘common-sense’ assertion 
that there are only two answers to the question ‘have you been abused?’: ‘yes’ or ‘I 
don’t know’. Thus what is being posited is a kind of anti-verificationism (the 
impossibility of any  falsification) which permanently sustains the potential for a 
positivistic account; which, of course, is the promise of the symbolic. 
 Within the terms of British conservatism we find a similar discursive 
operation: the various symptoms of declining economic performance, social and urban 
decay (etc.) are located with the generational abuses/betrayal of the 1960s. 
 
 
(6) Perhaps it is appropriate here to recall Barthes’ view of tautology as ‘a magical act 
ashamed of itself’ (1972:153). The universal ‘work’ of ideology, therefore, might be 
understood as the attempt to exorcise that shame through a set of linear narratives that 
try to conceal their circularity. 
 
(7) For example, while this writer has no sympathy with the ‘unspeakable in pursuit of 
the uneatable’, it is revealing that the ultimate objection to fox hunters is not an 
environmental one but that ‘they enjoy it’. 
 
(8) By metastatic, or the metastses of, enjoyment, Žižek means that the forms of 
enjoyment cannot be predicted according to any pre-given code or structure (as in a 
cancerous growth). Enjoyment has a primary, even ontological, status precisely 
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because it pre-exists the socio-symbolic order and always threatens the distortion and 
mutation of any order. 
 
(9) Indeed what appears to be at stake in E. Said’s (1994) observation of the extremely 
limited availability of African, Asian and Arabic literature is that ‘they’ might be 
describing ‘us’ 
 
(10) This type of sentiment is present in numerous ‘explanations’ of Britain’s 
‘decline’. A well-known example is M.Wiener’s English Culture and the Decline of 
the Industrial Spirit. 
 
(11) It seems as no surprise that James Bond movies (and their genre) became so 
popular with the arrival of the ‘global village’ in the 1960s. In You Only Live Twice, 
for example, Bond actually ‘becomes’ Japanese and yet, for all that, his Britishness 
shines through all the more: his passport, 007, is rather a licence to infiltrate and steal 
the enjoyment of the other. In a similar vein, under Thatcherism ‘we’ were encouraged 
to be more like the Germans and the Japanese in respect to industriousness and 
discipline. With John Major and, more recently, Tony Blair there is the familiar view 
that ‘we’ need to be in Europe in order to shape it in ‘our’ image. 
 
(12) Moreover as each of these embodiments of loss have either dissolved or become 
unconvincing then this undoubtedly deepened the crises of Thatcherism/Majorism (i.e. 
the messianism of its project became eroded and re-literalised). To put it in the terms 
of Hegel, British Conservative discourse has very much felt the effects of ‘the loss of 
the loss’. 
 
(13) As the line goes in Carry on Columbus: 'Nobody questions the Inquisition'. 
 
(14) It is interesting to note the paradoxes in both ‘left’ and ‘right’ wing accounts of 
the underclass. For C. Murray (as well as various articles by C. Murray see R. J. 
Hernstein and C. Murray, 1994) the underclass are a kind of genetic detritus (low 
IQ’s, a recalcitrant propensity to crime, etc.) - i.e. that’s simply the way ‘they’ are - 
and yet are treated as if they were fully responsible for their lack of integration and, 
therefore, should be made responsible for their original state of debt and summarily 
punished (withdrawal of welfare resources, etc.). 
 With the more ‘radical’ account of B. Campbell (1993), however, the urban 
violence of the underclass is seen to be the product of an inherent Neanderthal 
‘masculinity’ which, on the one hand, is regarded as an undifferentiated transcendental 
given, but which, on the other, men qua men are made responsible for. In a classic 
fantasy of projection, therefore, the very essence of masculinity is made responsible 
for the loss of social harmony. There are, of course, strong overlaps here with 
‘political correctness’. From this perspective the classic figure of the ‘white-
heterosexual-male’ is constitutive of the world of political difference and specificity 
(the plurality of the oppressed) only insofar as this figure is denied any specificity and 
is barred entry to this world. As Žižek puts it, in ‘the very act of emptying the white-
male-heterosexual position of all positive content, the PC attitude retains it as a 
universal form of subjectivity’ (1993: 214). Thus the problem with PC is not that it is 
too severe but that it is not severe enough: it is prepared to consider all identities as 
differential/differentiated subjectivities except the transcendental stereotype onto 
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which is projected the universal sense of loss/incompletion. The one thing PC culture 
cannot give up, therefore, is its ritual obeisance to the totemic embodiment of loss (in 
Hegelian terms, what this culture fears most is ‘the loss of the loss’ and the 
subsequent dissolution of the ‘cause’ behind the global forms of oppression). 
 
(15) Perhaps we could say here that there is a need to move beyond the jouissance 
sustaining the antagonism between the opposing schools. 
 
(16) For an excellent  exposition of the concept of iteration in Derrida’s work see 
H.Staten (1985). 
 
(17) More recently, Derrida develops this type of argument in terms of the essential 
undecidability between flesh and spirit (giving rise to the logic of the specter), such 
that both are necessarily and constitutively contaminated by each other. The 
particularity of the flesh will always involve the expression of something transcending 
its limitations, while the universality of spirit always requires an embodiment of 
address and intelligibility which distorts it. Thus the Sovereign may very well have 
particularistic identifications in other areas of the social: architecture for example. 
 
(18)  In this respect, Žižek appears to overstate the case when he argues that ‘the 
recourse to nationalism emerged in order to protect us from the traumatic 
disorientation, from the loss of the ground under our feet, caused by the disintegration 
of the ‘really existing socialism’’ (1993: 232). While we can agree that this is certainly 
the background to a ‘nationalist’ recomposition there is not a relation of necessity 
here, nor does it exhaust the possibilities of hegemonic recomposition. The types of 
political recomposition taking place in, for example, Hungary and the Czech and 
Slovak Republics, while they clearly have a ‘nationalist’ dimension, are not of the 
same order as those taking place in ex-Yugoslavia. What is overlooked is precisely the 
undecidability between a dislocated structure and its recomposition through which 
politics - as an ‘autonomous’ set of practices deriving from this very constitutive 
impossibility - emerges. 
 
(19) It is of course always possible to modify the historical contents of any ‘we’ 
against its ‘them’, but only on condition that the we/them problematic is essentially 
irresolvable. 
 
(20) See my ‘Post-metaphysical Culture and Politics’ for an extended discussion of 
this. 
 
(21) The lack of any inherent or necessary connection between (the opposing 
discourses of) liberalism and democracy is a point that has been made much earlier by 
C.B.MacPherson (1965). 
 
(22) Fascism was conceived as merely a symptom of  the inevitable collapse of 
capitalism that  would clear the ground for universal emancipation. 
 
(23) Here we see an opposite problem to that which we find in Marx. Instead of 
capitalism resolving the political terrain into a basic antagonism 
(proletariat/bourgeoisie), capitalism is regarded as generating a ‘post-modern’ 
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dispersal of non-antagonistic identities. Both positions are clearly unsatisfactory. See 
G. Daly (1999).  
 
(24) The point should also be made that the processes of social and political 
fragmentation are not simply the function of a logic of capital but are more generally 
linked to the dislocatory effects of modernity itself. In Eastern Europe, for example, 
we see how new  forms of political resistance were constituted around a diversity of 
demands for emancipatory rights which could not be secured within that model of a 
society conceived in terms of a universal class of producers. In this sense the idea of a 
‘disorganisation’ is one which may be applied to (‘really existing’) socialism as well 
as capitalism. See my ‘The Discursive Construction of Economic Space’ (1991) for a 
discussion of these points. 
 
(25) In this sense the primal lack would also be regarded as a primal gift: an 
opportunity to make alternative identifications which are neither pre-given nor 
imprisoning. 
 
(26) At the same time, however, perhaps we could say that Derrida should be 
supplemented with Spielberg. For as the film Caspar testifies, not all ghosts are 
friendly. 
 
(27) Bearing in mind that this is never a ‘boundary of essence’ but rather a negotiable 
political frontier. 
 
(28) This does not imply a return to a model or blueprint for democracy. There is no 
pre-given inventory of democratic belonging. Rather in radical democracy there exists 
a system of rules of political encounter - organised around the articulating principles 
of liberty and equality for all - such that groups will develop there own demands for 
autonomy/emancipation but crucially within the terms of a basic ‘grammar’ which 
ensures both a universalist consistency to a democratic culture and the potential for 
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